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Abstract
This paper develops a model of trade that features heterogeneous rms, technology choice and
dierent types of skilled labor in a general equilibrium framework. Its main contribution is to ex-
plain the impact of trade integration on technology adoption and wage inequalities. It also provides
empirical evidence to support the model's main assumption and predictions using plant-level panel
data from Chile's manufacturing sector (1990-1999). The theoretical framework oers a possible ex-
planation of the puzzling increase in skill premium in the developing countries. The key mechanism
is found in the eects of trade policy on the number of new rms upgrading technology and on the
skill-intensity of labor. Trade liberalization pushes up export revenues, raising the probability that
the most productive exporters will upgrade their technology. These rms then increase their relative
demand for skilled labor, thereby raising inequalities.
Keywords: Firm heterogeneity, trade reforms, technology adoption, skill premium, plant panel
data.
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1 Introduction
This paper considers a number of observations described in the empirical literature on international
trade, namely: (1) globalization; (2) rms in the same industry are heterogeneous; (3) the increase in
wage inequalities in unskilled labor-intensive countries; and (4) foreign technology transfers to developing
countries.
Trade liberalization took place in most developing countries in the 1980s and the early 1990s. This
process encompassed the reduction of unilateral import taris and non-tari barriers and the development
of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements among countries in the same region.
Several empirical studies conrm the existence of heterogeneous characteristics among rms in the
same industry. They demonstrate that exporters are more productive, larger, more intensive in skilled
labor and more capital-intensive than rms selling only to the domestic market. Roberts and Tybout
(1997), Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998), Bernard and Jensen (1995, 1999, 2004), Bernard and Wagner
(1998), Sullivan (1997), Aw, Chung and Roberts (2000), and Kraay (2002) all nd that exporters perform
better than non-exporters.
There is also empirical evidence of growing wage inequalities between skilled and unskilled labor due
to a higher proportion of skilled workers within industries following trade reforms in unskilled labor-
intensive developing countries. A reduction in import taris brings down the relative price of imported
intermediate and capital goods, raising the relative demand for skilled labor 1. The second explanation
focuses on how foreign competition impacts on nal goods. Trade liberalization increases the number
of foreign competitors and encourages domestic rms to adopt high technology or conduct skill-biased
technological change 2.
This paper's main contribution to the existing literature is to investigate trade-induced technolog-
ical change in a general equilibrium framework of heterogeneous rms. A xed technology adoption
cost and both skilled and unskilled labor are introduced into a model of monopolistic competition and
heterogeneous rms to explain the eects of trade on technology choice and wage inequalities.
The mechanisms by which trade policy aects the relative demand for skilled labor and skill premium
have been largely studied. Two types of arguments can be identied, depending on whether they focus
mainly on the eects of international trade or on technological change.
Bernard, Redding and Schott (BRS) (2006) developed a two-sector model using the Hecksher-Ohlin-
Samuelson framework and introducing heterogeneous rms in each sector. The main dierence with our
framework is that we focus on the relationship between trade, technology choice and wage inequalities.
The key mechanism explaining the rise in wage inequalities in our model is based on the existence of a
xed skill-biased technology cost. In this model, the level of skill intensity required by rms is determined
by their endogenous decision to upgrade technology, while the level of skill intensity in the BRS model is
1Gasparini and Acosta (2002) and Bustos (2005) on Argentina, Sanchez-Paramo and Schady (2003) on Argentina, Chile,
Colombia and Mexico, Verhoogen (2006) on Mexico and Muendler et al. (2003) on Brazil all nd evidence of a positive
correlation between skill premium and foreign technology acquisition in all sectors following trade liberalization.
2Behrman, Birdsall and Szekely (2000) on 18 Latin American countries, Thoenig and Verdier (2003) on France, Attanasio,
Goldberg and Pavnick (2004) on Colombia, Muendler et al. (2003) on Brazil all nd evidence supporting this argument.
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exogenously determined 3.
The second type of argument is based on skill-biased technological change (SBTC). These models
have been developed mainly by Acemoglu (2003) and Thoenig and Verdier (2003). International trade
prompts innovation and SBTC, thereby raising the relative demand for skilled labor and hence the skill
premium. The model presented in this paper focuses on a dierent and complementary channel based on
technology adoption to explain the relation between trade liberalization and wage inequalities.
Some theoretical studies link both arguments: trade-induced skill-biased technological change. Ekholm
and Midelfart (2005) explore the impact of trade liberalization on relative returns to skilled and unskilled
labor. Trade openness increases the market access of rms, creating incentives to upgrade skill-intensive
technology and raising the skill premium. To investigate the eects of trade on technology choice, our
model introduces rms that are heterogeneous in terms of their productivity gains.
The model developed in this paper is also closely related to Yeaple (2005), who develops a trade model
of homogeneous rms and heterogeneous skills. In Yeaple's model, rm heterogeneity is an endogenous
result of the distribution of skilled workers and technology choice. Trade reduces the relative xed costs of
high technology and thus increases the share of skilled labor and the skill premium. Unlike Yeaple (2005),
the rms in our model are heterogeneous even before they start producing and each rm employs both
skilled and unskilled workers. Trade liberalization encourages technology adoption in unskilled-intensive
sectors, thereby raising their skilled labor demand. Another important departure from Yeaple's model is
that we take into account the eects of the skill premium on rm's decisions.
Bustos (2005) expands on Melitz (2003) and Yeaple (2005) to explain the skill upgrading prompted
by technology adoption that follows the implementation of trade reforms in developing countries. Using
Argentinean rm level data, she nds empirical evidence supporting the argument of trade-induced skill-
biased technological change. In the theoretical framework, Bustos considers neither the rm's entry-exit
process nor the reallocation of resources among rms or the impact of relative wages on price indexes and
other aggregate variables. Conversely, I develop a general equilibrium model that considers the impact
of the skill premium on aggregate variables and on the selection process into the domestic and foreign
markets.
In order to characterize the dierences between rms in the same industry, we introduce rm hetero-
geneity in keeping with Melitz (2003). However, his model is based on the assumption of homogeneous
labor. The introduction of dierent types of skilled labor and skill-intensity dierences between rms
enables us to explain the eects of trade integration on the skill premium. We introduce two sources of
cross-plant productivity variation. The rst is an exogenous Hicks-neutral productivity factor, which is
drawn from a continuous distribution. The second is an endogenous skilled-labor-augmenting productiv-
ity factor, which is binary. The high-productivity value of this factor is available to rms that are willing
to pay a xed technology adoption cost.
Trade liberalization changes the scope for prots in the domestic and foreign markets. The reduction
3Some studies focus on outsourcing as the main mechanism explaining the rise in skill premium in industrialized and
developing countries. See Feenstra and Hanson (1999, 2000).
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of variable trade costs makes low productivity rms worse o and high productivity rms better o, as
shown by Melitz's model ("selection eect"). Following the implementation of trade reforms, the increase
in export revenues raises the probability that the most productive low technology exporters will upgrade
their technology. These rms increase their relative demand for skilled labor, thereby raising the skill
premium. The latter eect is benecial to low-technology rms compared with high-technology rms.
Since the increase in the skill premium is a second order eect, the "net eect" of reductions in trade
frictions on both the extensive margin of trade and the extensive margin of technology is positive.
Lastly, we provide empirical evidence in support of the theoretical model's main assumption and
predictions based on plant level panel data from Chile's manufacturing sector for the period 1990-1999.
We rst estimate a translog cost function to test the assumption of skill-biased technology. We then test
the predictions: (1) whether trade cost reduction encourages exporters to upgrade their technology and
(2) whether these exporters have a higher relative demand for skilled labor following trade liberalization.
This is done using specic data on export barriers at industry level.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 shows how the model is set up. Section 3
presents the main theoretical ndings. Section 4 presents the empirical estimations. Section 5 contains
the conclusion.
2 Setup of the model
2.1 Closed economy equilibrium
2.2 Households Consumption
The representative household allocates consumption from among the range of domestic goods (j) produced
using low technology (
l) and those produced using more advanced and skill-biased technology (
h). The
standard CES utility function (C) represents the consumer preferences. The elasticity of substitution
between low and high technology goods is ﬃ > 1: C =
R
j2
l
C
ﬃ 1
ﬃ
lj dj +
R
j2
h
C
ﬃ 1
ﬃ
hj dj
 ﬃ
ﬃ 1
The optimal relative demand functions are: Ci =

P
p
i
ﬃ
C i = fl; hg (1.A)
2.3 Production
There is a continuum of rms, each producing a dierent range of goods, in monopolistic competition.
Production requires two dierent types of labor: unskilled (li) and skilled (hi) inelastically supplied.
Heterogeneous rms with dierent productivity levels (') are introduced, in keeping with Melitz (2003).
We adopt a CES production technology that combines skilled and unskilled labor to produce output.
Yi = ' ((ahhi)

+ (li)

)
1
 i = fl; hg ah = f1; sg s > 1 (2.A)
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The subscript "l" represents rms producing with low technology and "h" those using high technology.
The coecient "ah " represents the eciency of high technology, corresponding to skilled labor. The
elasticity of substitution between the two types of labor is ﬀ = 11  :We assume that skilled and unskilled
labor are imperfect substitutes, hence 0 <  < 1 and 1  ﬀ  1.
There are three types of xed costs in a closed economy: (1) a xed sunk entry cost (fE), that
rms have to pay to enter the market (e.g. costs to develop a blueprint); (2) a xed per-period cost (f)
that all rms incur, such as that associated with investment in local distribution; and (3) a xed per-
period technology adoption cost (ft), which represents investment in new and more advanced skill-biased
technology. To make the model tractable, all xed costs are measured in units of imported capital and
their price is normalized to one. Two groups of domestic rms can be identied in a closed economy
equilibrium: (1) low productivity rms without enough prots to assume the xed technology costs (Nl);
and (2) the most productive rms, which have acquired new technology (Nh). The rst-order condition
of monopolistic rms is such that prices reect a constant mark-up over marginal cost. In this model,
marginal costs can be divided into an intrinsic productivity term (') and the unit cost of production (cl
or ch), which reects the ratio of skilled (wh) to unskilled (wl) wages paid by the rm.
Low technology rms (Nl) High technology rms (Nh)
(3.A) pl =
ﬃ
ﬃ 1
cl
'i
ph =
ﬃ
ﬃ 1
ch
'i
(4.A) cl =

(wl)

 1 + (wh)


 1
 1
ch =

(wl)

 1 +

wh
ah
 

 1
 1
(5.A) rl =

P
pl
ﬃ 1
R rh =

P
ph
ﬃ 1
R
rl = rh

ch
cl
ﬃ 1
rh = rl

ch
cl
1 ﬃ
(6.A) l = plYl   wlll   whhl   f h = phYh   wllh   whhh   f   ft
l =
rl
ﬃ
  f
Goods Market Equilibrium (7.A) Yi = Ci for i = fl; hg
High-technology rms have to pay a xed technology adoption cost (ft), but have a lower marginal
cost since skill eciency "ah > 1" reduces the unit cost (ch). Note that "ah" is not heterogeneous,
since all rms that upgrade their technology reduce their unit cost by the same proportion. Even if two
rms have the same productivity level, the revenues of the rm using the more advanced technology are
higher than those of the low-technology rm (cl > ch ) rl < rh ). Hence, rms that decide to upgrade
technology increase their revenues by

ch
cl
1 ﬃ
. Otherwise, the rm employs low technology, where
ah = 1. The introduction of heterogeneous rms in terms of productivity levels determines the endogenous
technological status of the rms. Only the most productive rms can switch to high technology and
become even more ecient. The term

ch
cl

represents the relative unit cost of skilled labor and is
determined by both the skill premium !(wh
wl
) and skill eciency "ah". This relative skilled labor unit
cost is an increasing function of the skill premium
@
ch
cl
@!
> 0 since 0 <  < 1 (See Appendix 1).

ch
cl

=

(!)

1 +1
(!)

1 +(ah)

1 
 1 
(8.A)
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2.4 Firm's decisions
2.4.1 The decision to exit or stay and produce
Firms have to pay a sunk entry cost to enter the market before they know what their productivity level
will be. Entrants then derive their productivity "'" from common distribution density g('); with support
[0;1] and cumulative distribution G()4. Since there is a xed production cost (f), only those rms with
enough prots to pay this cost can produce. The prots of the marginal rm that decides to stay and
produce are equal to zero:l ('

l ) = 0. The value "'

l " is the productivity cuto to produce.
rl('

l )
ﬃ
= f ) 'ﬃ 1l = f c
ﬃ 1
l
ﬃ
	 (9.A) Where 	 = P
ﬃ 1R

ﬃ
ﬃ 1
1 ﬃ
2.4.2 The decision to adopt high technology
If a rm decides to stay in the market once it has received its productivity draw, it may also decide
to upgrade its technology to reduce its unit costs on the basis of its protability. Only a subset of the
most productive rms will switch to high technology since the xed technology cost is higher than the
xed production cost. The rms that do will be those whose increase in domestic revenues due to their
adoption of high technology enables them to pay the xed technology costs. The condition to acquire
the new and more advanced technology is given by: h('

h) = l('

h)
[rh('

h) rl('

h)]
ﬃ
= ft ) '
ﬃ 1
h =
ft
[c1 ﬃh  c
1 ﬃ
l ]
ﬃ
	 (10.A)
The productivity cuto for technology upgrading is represented by "'h". This value is the minimum
productivity level for the marginal rm able to adopt high technology. By combining equation (9.A) with
(10.A), we obtain 'h as an implicit function of '

l .

'h
'
l
ﬃ 1
) 'h = '

l

ft
f
 1
ﬃ 1

ch
cl
1 ﬃ
  1
 1
1 ﬃ
(11.A) *** To ensure that
'h > '

l , we have to assume that the amortized value of the xed technology cost is much higher
than the xed production cost. The partitioning condition that sustains the closed economy equilibrium
is written: ft
ch
cl
1 ﬃ
 1
 > f (11'.A) .
2.5 Aggregation
The distribution of the productivity levels of low- and high-technology rms is represented by l(') and
h('), respectively. Therefore, l(') is the conditional distribution of g(') on ['

l ; '

h] while h(') is the
conditional distribution of g(') on ['h;1) :
l(') =
g(')
G('
h
) G('
l
) if '

l < 'i < '

h (12.A) ;h(') =
g(')
1 G('
h
) if 'i > '

h (13.A)
4These functions are dened in the following section.
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Where [1 G('l )] and [1 G('

h)] represent the ex-ante probability of successful entry and the ex-
ante probability of having a productivity draw higher than'h: These distributions dene the weighted
averages of the rms' productivity levels as functions of the cutos.
e'lﬃ 1  1G('
h
) G('
l
)
R 'h
'
l
(')
ﬃ 1
g(')d' (14.A); f'hﬃ 1  11 G('
h
)
R
1
'
h
(')
ﬃ 1
g(')d' (15.A)
f'h represents the ex-ante weighted average productivity level of high-technology rms before they
decide to adopt the technology. The ex-post productivity average of high-technology rms has to take
into account the increase in the rms' eciency due to the acquisition of the more advanced technology
that allows them to reduce their unit costs and raise their market shares by this term

ch
cl
1 ﬃ
since
rh(f'h) = rl(f'h) chcl 1 ﬃ : Therefore, the weighted average productivity index of the economy (f'T )
represents the market shares of all the rms. The low- and high-technology average productivity levels
and the aggregate productivity index dene all the aggregate variables (see Appendix 1).
f'T ﬃ 1 = 1N Nl ( e'l)ﬃ 1 +Nh  chcl 1 ﬃ (f'h)ﬃ 1

(16.A)
2.6 Labor Market Equilibrium and the Skill Premium
Both skilled and unskilled labor are assumed to be perfectly mobile across rms in a country. Although
rms have dierent labor demands depending on their productivity level, all rms pay the same skilled
and unskilled wage. This means that there is a unique skill premium in a country, which is determined
by the aggregate skilled and unskilled labor demands.
Firms' skilled and unskilled labor demands are determined by prot maximization. By plugging
equation 2.A (production function) into equation 6.A (prot function), the prot maximization process
yields the following relationship between skilled labor, unskilled labor and the skill premium:
hi
li
= !
1
 1 (ah)

1  for i = fl; hg ah > 1 ifi = h (17.A)
Firms producing with more advanced skill-biased technology will have a higher relative skilled labor
demand than rms using low technology. In monopolistic competition, rms anticipate their nal demand.
Plugging equation 17.A into 2.A and then into the goods market equilibrium equation (7.A) yields the
rms' skilled and unskilled labor demands5.
li =
Ci
'
c
1
1 
i (wl)
1
 1 (18:A) hi =
Ci
'
c
1
1 
i (wh)
1
 1 (ah)

1  (19.A)
Where Ci is the demand for good "i" produced with low (l) or high (h) technology, and ci is per unit
cost. The overall national demand for unskilled and skilled labor is determined by aggregating the rms'
individual demands (see Appendix 1).
Ld =
R 'h
'
l
Nlll (')l(')d'+
R
1
'
h
Nhlh (')h(')d' (20.A)
5By using the price rule given by equation 3.A, inserting 7.A (goods market equilibrium) into 6.A. (prot function), and
plugging equation 18.A (labor demands) into 17.A and then into 6.A, we nd that :l =
rl
ﬃ
  f = plYl   wlll   whhl   f
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Hd =
R 'h
'
l
Nlhl (')l(')d'+
R
1
'
h
Nhhh (')h(')d' (21.A)
The skill premium (!) is determined by the equality between aggregate relative skilled labor demand
and supply. H
s
Ls
= H
d
Ld
) ! = g(H
s
Ls
; ah; Nl; Nh;
f'hf'l )
Hs
Ls
= !
1
 1
 
1+(ah)

1 

Nh
Nl
g'hf'l ﬃ 1A
1+

Nh
Nl
g'hf'l ﬃ 1A
!
(22.A) where A =

ch
cl
 ﬃ 
(!)

 1+1
!
ah
 
 1+1
! 1

2.7 Closed Economy Equilibrium Conditions
Unlike Melitz's model, the equilibrium productivity cuto level('l ) depends on the skill premium, which
is determined by equation 22.A. In this model, therefore, the equilibrium value of 'l is determined by
three conditions: the free entry condition (FE), the zero cuto prots condition (ZCP) and the labor
market clearing condition (LMC). The value of 'l at equilibrium will then pin down the rest of the
model's variables.
The Free Entry Condition (FE): before entering the market and knowing their productivity level,
rms calculate the present value of average prot ows to decide whether to enter the domestic market.
All rms except the marginal rms earn positive prots. Hence, average prot level e is positive. As in
Melitz (2003), ev is the present value of the average prot ows: ev =  1P
t=0
(1  )
t e and vE is the net
value of entry given by6: vE = (1 G('l )) ev  fE = 1 G('l ) e  fE . FE states that the value of entry is
equal to zero.
FE: vE = 0 ) e = fE
(1 G('l ))
(23.A)
The Zero Cuto Prot Condition (ZCP): also determines a relation between average prots and
the productivity level of the marginal rm.
ZCP: e = ll( e'l) + hh(f'h) (24.A)
Assumption 1: Productivity draws are distributed according to a Pareto distribution g (') = k('min)
k
(')k+1
with a lower bound 'min and a shape parameter k (see Appendix 1).
Proposition 1: Under Assumption 1 and the partitioning condition (eq. 11'.A), there exists a unique
equilibrium cuto ('l ) determined by ZCP, FE and LMC.
Proof. See Appendix 1 
ZCP=FE 'l = f(ah; !; fE ; f; ft; )
LMC H
s
Ls
= H
d
Ld
) ! = g(H
s
Ls
; ah; f; ft; )
6.The factor of discount is modeled following Melitz with a Poisson death shock probability.
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Proposition 2: Under Assumption 1 and the partitioning condition (eq. 11'.A), 'l is a decreasing
function of the skill premium but the aggregate relative skilled labor demand does not depend on 'l and
therefore the skill premium is independent of this cuto.7
@'l
@
ch
cl
< 0.
Proof. See Appendix 1 
This implies that an increase in the relative skilled labor unit cost ( ch
cl
), due to an increase in the skill
premium (
@
ch
cl
@!
> 0), reduces the productivity cuto. Hence, an increase in the skill premium benets
the least productive unskilled-intensive rms. This cuto ('l ) then determines the technological cuto
level ('h) using equation (11.A).
Proposition 3: Under Assumption 1 and the partitioning condition (eq. 11'.A), the technological
cuto ('h) is an increasing function of the relative skilled per unit cost and of the skill premium. An
increase in the relative skill per unit cost reduces the number of rms producing with high technology
skilled biased:
@'h
@
ch
cl
> 0.
Proof. See Appendix 1 
The Capital Market Condition: imported capital is required to pay xed entry costs and pro-
duction and technology adoption costs. It is supplied inelastically by the rest of the world under the
assumption that capital markets operate independently from labor markets8. Its price is normalized to
one. The capital market clearing condition is9: K = Nlf +Nh (f + ft) +NEfE (25.A)
The Global Accounting condition:establishes that the sum of unskilled and skilled revenues and
the capital used to paid xed costs is equal to the aggregate revenue of the economy (R).
whH + wlL+K = R (26.A)
R = Ner and e = er
ﬃ
  f   fth. The total number of rms is obtained by using the average
prot to obtain average revenue and plugging it into this condition (eq. 26.A).
N = whH+wlL+K(e+f+fth)ﬃ (27.A)
2.8 Open economy
Countries are symmetric in the open economy equilibrium. Aggregate variables (prices, consumption and
revenues) are equivalent in both countries. So there are no dierences in the notation of variables for
home and foreign countries. In an open economy equilibrium, there are two dierent cases depending
7In the general case, the aggregate relative skilled labor demand depends on the average productivities and thereby on
the cutos. There is a unique solution (!,'l ) determined by the intersection between Free Entry-ZCP condition and the
Labor Market Condition. In this case the impact of trade variable costs is ambiguous. Therefore I assume the Pareto
distribution to get an analytical solution of the equilibrium cuto.
8If we assume that xed costs are paid with skilled and unskilled labor, this will complicate the calculation and the
skilled premium will be a function of the production productivity cuto.
9The number of rms producing with low technology (Nl = lN), those producing with high technology (Nh = hN)
and the number of new entrants (NE =
N
1 G('
l
)
) are determined by the total number of rms and the probabilities which
depend on productivity cuto levels.
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on the relation between the xed technology cost (ft), xed (fx) and variable trade costs (ﬁ) and the
relative skilled labor unit cost ( ch
cl
). The rst case represents an economy where xed technology costs
are substantially higher than xed and variable trade costs. Under these conditions, there are three
groups of rms: (1) the least productive rms selling only on the domestic market and producing with
low technology (Ndl); (2) exporters producing with low technology (Nxl); and (3) the most productive
rms capable of exporting and upgrading their technology (Nxh). In the second case, xed and variable
trade costs are higher than the xed technology cost. All exporters produce with high technology and
there are two dierent types of domestic rms. Since the Chile data patterns t the rst case better (see
Section 4), we only derive the equilibrium for this case10.
2.9 Set-up of the open economy equilibrium
2.10 Households Consumption
Goods produced by domestic rms can be traded or not and produced using low or high technology
depending on the rm's protability. The representative household allocates consumption from among
a set of domestic goods produced with low technology (
dl) and two dierent sets of foreign imported
varieties produced with low (
xl) and high technology (
xh). Consumers preferences are represented by
the standard C.E.S. utility function: C =
R
j2
dl
C
ﬃ 1
ﬃ
dl dj +
R
j2
xl
C
ﬃ 1
ﬃ
xl dj +
R
j2
xh
C
ﬃ 1
ﬃ
xh dj
 ﬃ
ﬃ 1
The optimal relative demand functions are: Ci =

P
p
i
ﬃ
C for i = fdl; xl; xhg (1.B)
2.11 Production
Similar to the closed economy equilibrium, the production function using skilled and unskilled labor is rep-
resented by a CES function given by:Yi = ' ((ahhi)

+ (li)

)
1
 for i = fdl; xl; xhg (2.B)
Only the most productive exporters will be able to switch to high technology. Since high technology
is skilled biased, the rms that acquire this technology will have greater skilled labor eciency (ah > 1)
and a lower marginal cost (ch < cl). More productive rms have lower unit costs and are thereby able to
set lower prices and have higher revenues as well as greater prots.
1.Non exporters - Low Technology (Ndl)
(3.B) pdl =
ﬃ
ﬃ 1
cl
'i
(5.B) rdl =

P
pdl
ﬃ 1
R
(4.B) cl =

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 1 + (wh)


 1
 1
(6.B) dl = pdlYdl   wlldl   whhdl   f =
rdl
ﬃ
  f
2.Exporters - Low Technology (Nxl) 3. Exporters - High Technology (Nxh)
pxl = pdl (1 + ﬁ) rxh =

P
pdh(1+ﬁ)
ﬃ 1
R
rxl =

P
pdl(1+ﬁ)
ﬃ 1
R rdh + rxh = rdh
h
1 + (1 + ﬁ)
1 ﬃ
i
dl + xl =
rdl[1+(1+ﬁ)1 ﬃ]
ﬃ
  f   fx dh + xh =
rdh[1+(1+ﬁ)1 ﬃ]
ﬃ
  f   fx   ft
Goods Market Equilibrium (7.B) Ci = Yi for i = fdl; dhg ; Ci =
Yi
(1+ﬁ) for i = fxl; xhg
10The derivation of the second open economy equilibrium is available in the author's PhD dissertation.
10
Given that unit costs (cl; ch) are independent of productivity levels, note that equation (4.B) in the
open economy scenario is identical to (4.A). The relative unit costs remain unchanged (equation 8.B =
8.A).
2.12 Firm's decisions
2.12.1 Production and Export decision
Both the decision to enter the market and to produce remain unchanged relatively to the closed economy
equilibrium. The marginal rm that decides to stay is the one whose prots are equal to zero:
dl ('

dl) = 0 )
rdl('

dl)
ﬃ
= f ) 'ﬃ 1dl = f c
ﬃ 1
l
ﬃ
	 (9.B)
Similar to Melitz (2003), the tradability condition implies that only rms with operating prots that
oset the amortized xed export cost per period (fx)) will be able to export. The zero cuto prots
condition to enter the export market is given by:
xl ('

xl) = 0 )
rxl
ﬃ
= fx ) '
ﬃ 1
xl = fx (1 + ﬁ)
ﬃ 1
cﬃ 1l
ﬃ
	 (10.1.B)
The export productivity cuto is represented by "'xl". This value corresponds to the productivity
level of the marginal rm able to enter the foreign market. Combining (9.B) and (10.1.B) leads to the
denition of 'xl as an implicit function of '

dl :
rxl('

xl)
rdl('dl)
= fxﬃ
fﬃ
) 'xl = '

dl

fx
f
 1
ﬃ 1
(1 + ﬁ) (11.1.B)
2.12.2 The decision to adopt High Technology
Given that, in this case, the xed technology costs are higher than the trade costs, a rm will never nd
it protable to switch to high technology and decide not to export. Therefore, only a subset of exporters
will upgrade to high technology. They will be those exporters whose increase in domestic and export
sales due to their adoption of high technology will enable them to pay the xed technology costs. This
condition is given by: dh('

xh) + xh('

xh) = dl('

xh) + xl('

xh)
[rdh('

xh)+rxh('

xh)] [rdl('

xh)+rxl('

xh)]
ﬃ
= ft ) '
ﬃ 1
xh =
ft
[1+(1+ﬁ)1 ﬃ][c1 ﬃh  c
1 ﬃ
l ]
ﬃ
	 (10.2.B)
The productivity cuto to acquire high technology is represented by "'xh". The value of ('

xh) as a
function of ('dl) is given by (9.B) and (10.2.B):
'xh = '

dl

ft
f
 1
ﬃ 1

ch
cl
1 ﬃ
  1
 h
1 + (1 + ﬁ)
1 ﬃ
i 11 ﬃ
(11.2.B)
The specic condition for the partitioning of rms by export and technology status, which ensures
that 'xh > '

xl > '

dl is:
ft
[1+(1+ﬁ)1 ﬃ]

ch
cl
1 ﬃ
 1
 > (1 + ﬁ)ﬃ 1 fx > f (11'.B)
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This condition establishes that adopting high technology is more expensive than exporting and thereby
suggests that only the most productive exporters can upgrade their technology. The weighted productivity
average of each group of rms (f'dl; f'xl;g'xh) is dened using the same type of weighted average function
dened in equations 12.A -16.A (Appendix 2 details the aggregation).
2.13 Labor Market Equilibrium and the Skill Premium
In the open economy equilibrium, exporters producing with low and high technology will increase their
skilled and unskilled labor demand to produce for the foreign market. These demands are determined
similarly to (18.A) and (19.A), taking into account the domestic demand for nal goods (Cdl; Cdh)
and the exporting rms' foreign demand for nal goods (Cxl; Cxh). Equation 17.A remains unchanged
(17.A=17.B).
lxi =
[Cxi+Cdi]
'
c
1
1 
i (wl)
1
 1 (18.B)
hxi =
[Cxi+Cdi]
'
c
1
1 
i (wh)
1
 1 (ah)

1  (19.B) Where i = fl; hg ah > 1 if i = h
Like (20.A) and (21.A), the overall national demand for unskilled and skilled labor is determined by
aggregating the rms' individual demands. Here, we have to take into account rms producing in the
domestic market and both types of exporting rms (see Appendix 2 for a presentation of the aggregate
demands).
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R 'xl
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R
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Nxhhxh (')xh(')d' (21.B)
The aggregate relative skilled labor supply and demand jointly determine the skill premium.
Hs
Ls
= H
d
Ld
) ! = g(H
s
Ls
; ah; Ndl; Nxl; Nxh;f'dl; f'xl;g'xh) (22:B)
2.14 Open Economy Equilibrium Conditions
As in the closed economy equilibrium, we obtain an analytical solution for the productivity, technological
and export cutos using a Pareto distribution of productivity draws (see Appendix 2). The equilibrium
level of the productivity cuto is determined by the FE, the new ZCP and LMC conditions, just as in
the closed economy equilibrium. FE remains unchanged. Under the ZCP condition for the open economy
equilibrium, we have to take into account the average prots of low- and high-technology exporters11.
FE: e = fE
(1 G('dl))
(23.B)
ZCP:e = dl(f'dl)dl + xl [dl(f'xl) + xl(f'xl)] + xh [dh(g'xh) + xh(g'xh)] (24.B)
11The variables "l; xh; xl; x" represent the probabilities of being a low technology rm (l), an exporting high tech-
nology rm (xh), an exporting low technology rm (xl) and nally an exporting rm (x)(See Appendix 2).
12
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Proposition 4: Under Assumption 1 and the partitioning condition of open economy (eq. 11'.B),
there exists a unique costly trade equilibrium cuto ('dl).
Proof. See Appendix 2
Capital Market and Global Accounting Conditions: 12
K = Ndlf +Nxl (f + fx) +Nxh (f + fx + ft) +NEfE (25.B)
whH + wlL+K = R (26.B)
N = whH+wlL+K[e+f+fxxl+(fx+ft)xh]ﬃ (27.B)
3 The model's ndings: the impact of trade liberalization
This section looks at the impact of trade liberalization on rms' decisions. The reduction in variable
trade costs aects both the extensive margin of trade (the number of exporters) and the extensive margin
of technology adoption (the number of high-technology rms).
Variable trade costs aect rms' decisions in a number of ways. The rst two mechanisms are the
selection eects in the domestic and foreign markets, as presented by Melitz (2003). The entry of the most
productive foreign exporters onto the domestic market reduces all the rms' domestic prots, prompting
the exit of the least productive rms. Trade integration, on the other hand, raises export prots and has
a positive impact on the extensive margin of trade.
Proposition 5: Under Assumption 1 and the partitioning condition of open economy (eq. 11'.B),
average domestic prots of low technology rms are an increasing function of trade variable costs, while
average export prots are a decreasing function of trade variable costs: @ll(f'l)
@ﬁ
> 0 ; @xlxl(g'xl)
@ﬁ
< 0.
Proof. See Appendix 2
This model sets out to introduce yet another channel based on the eects of trade on the extensive
margin of technology adoption and its impact on the skill premium. The increase in export protability
creates incentives to upgrade technology. Therefore the most productive low-technology exporters adopt
high technology and raise their relative demand for skilled labor.
Proposition 6: Under Assumption 1 and the partitioning condition of open economy (eq. 11'.B),
both the aggregate relative demand of skilled labor and the skill premium are decreasing functions of trade
variable costs:
@(HL )
d
@ﬁ
< 0) @!
@ﬁ
< 0
Proof. See Appendix 2
The last trade liberalization channel is the skill premium eect. In the general equilibrium, an upturn
in the skill premium has a dierent impact on rms' decisions depending on their intensity in skilled
12Both conditions have to take into account trade costs.
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and unskilled labor. However, this is a second-order eect stemming from the increase in the extensive
margin of technology induced by selection. The low-technology unskilled-intensive rms benet from
the reduction in the relative unskilled labor wage (skill premium appreciation) compared with the most
productive, skilled-intensive workers.
Proposition 7: Under Assumption 1 and the partitioning condition of open economy (eq. 11'.B),
average prots of low technology rms are an increasing function of the relative skilled per unit cost and
thereby, of the skill premium, while average prots of high technology rms are a decreasing function of
the skill premium: @ll(f'l)
@
ch
cl
(!)
> 0; @xlxl(g'xl)
@ﬁ
> 0 ; @xh(g'xh)
@
ch
cl
(!)
< 0
Proof. See Appendix 2
Opposite forces aect both the production and technology cuto: (1) the foreign competition and
export selection eect, and (2) the skill premium eect. In order to determine which eect dominates,
I run simulations of the impact of trade variable costs reduction on the equilibrium productivity cuto
taking into account the variations of the skill premium (See Appendix 2 and 3)13. Under the specic
partitioning condition, the eects of trade reforms are quite unambiguous. Given that the increase in skill
premium is a second-order eect, the net eect of trade reforms on the productivity cuto is negative
(Graph 1 in Appendix 3). The impact of variable trade costs is unambiguous and positive for the extensive
margin of trade. New unskilled-intensive rms nd it protable to start exporting. Lastly, the net eect
of trade liberalization on the extensive margin of technology is also positive. The increase in export
protability osets the increase in the skill premium (Graph 2).
Compared to a model of homogeneous rms, this model predicts that: (1) A reduction
in variable trade costs encourages only those who are already exporters to upgrade their technology;
(2)Only the new high-technology exporters increase their relative demand for skilled labor.
4 Empirical evidence
4.1 Data and descriptive analysis
This section provides some evidence in support of the theoretical model's predictions and key assumption,
namely that advanced technology is skill biased. This evidence draws on a database of Chilean plants
provided by the ENIA Survey, a comprehensive manufacturing census covering all plants with more
than 10 employees from 1979 to 199914. Given that Chile is a developing country highly dependent on
imported capital equipment and intermediate inputs, we consider that the most appropriate proxies for
high technology are foreign technology measures. These measures comprise expenditure on imported
13In order to nd the equilibrium value of the skill premium, I used the "FindRoot" command of Matematica which uses
a root-nding algorithm. The results remain robust for dierent parameters values well established in the literature (See
Appendix 3)
14The data used covers value-added, investment in capital equipment, imported inputs, foreign technology assistance,
skilled and unskilled labor, and the share of skilled and unskilled labor in the wage bill. Export sales are reported from 1990
onwards. The plants' TFP is estimated by Bas and Ledezma (2007) based on the semi-parametric estimations by Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003). Several specic sector-level deators (Isic-3dig Rev2 1992) are applied to value-added, technological
measures, materials and investment.
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inputs and foreign technological assistance (FTA). Table 5 (Appendix 4) summarizes the variables and
data requirements.
We use two measures of variable trade costs from the Trade and Production Database (World Bank
and CEPII). The rst is a measure of export border eects at the two-digit industry level between Chile
and its main trading partners (1990-1999), estimated by Bas and Ledezma (2007) using a gravity model
based on Fontagne, Mayer and Zignago (2005). The second is an average of import taris at the three-
digit industry level (1991-1999) set by Chile's main trading partners. The average reduction of export
border eect in the period is 20% and the one of average import tari is 7% (Figure 4, Appendix 4)15.
Table 6 (Appendix 4) summarizes the rms' main characteristics (3,900 plants per year). Exporters
(31%) are larger16, more productive (higher TFP), more skilled and capital intensive and use more FTA
and imported inputs than non-exporters (69%). However, the percentage of non-exporters using FTA
(3%) and imported inputs (11%) is very low. The features of the open economy equilibrium described
in the previous section t the descriptive evidence for the case of Chile. In order to test the assumption
of heterogeneous rms in terms of productivity levels, we estimate the impact of export status (contin-
uing, new, switchers and exiting exporters) on the plants' TFP. Table 7 (Appendix 4) reports on these
ndings. Once we have controlled for initial size, FDI and nancial constraint indicators (column 4),
only continuing, new exporters and switchers are more productive than those rms that sell solely on
the domestic market. Among the exporters, the most productive are those that exported throughout the
entire period. Continuing exporters are 28% more productive than non-exporters, while new exporters
and switchers are 17% more productive. Those rms using foreign technology are more productive (31%)
than the ones using domestic technology (column 5).
Our analysis of growth in the relative skilled labor demand and skill premium uses the decomposition
approach developed by Machin and Van Reenen (1998) (Tables 8 and 9 Appendix 4). From 1979 to 1999,
the relative demand for skilled labor rose 20% at the three-digit industry level. This increase is entirely
explained by the within-industry variation. The between indicator is negative and extremely small 17.
During the debt crisis (1979-1986), skill intensity rose to 37% at the two-digit industry level. A full
26% of this increase is explained by the within estimator, while only 11% is explained by the between
indicator. In the 1990s, there was also a rise in the relative demand for skilled labor, which is entirely
explained by the within estimator. Similar ndings hold for relative skilled wages in all periods.
4.2 Testing the assumption: foreign technology skill-biased
Since we only have data on the cost of skilled and unskilled labor (wage bill share), there is an endogeneity
issue between the relative skilled labor demand and the skill premium. We therefore use the minimization
cost function approach instead of a CES approach to test whether foreign technology is complementary
15Latin American countries, the European Union and the USA. Since there is no data available on taris in 1994 and
1997, we take the average of 1991-1993 and 1996-1999.
16Size classication: large rms have more than 150 workers, medium rms have more than 50 and up to 149 workers
and small rms have more than 10 and up to 49.
17Similar results hold at 2 digit industry level and at the rm level
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with skilled labor18. In this framework, rms minimize the cost of both skilled and unskilled labor
assuming that capital stock is quasi-xed. The translog cost function is:
(I)Sit = 1 + y ln(V Ait) + k ln(Kit=V Ait) + T (TECHit) + sIND + tY EAR+ it
Dependant variable Sit is the share of skilled workers in the wage bill; K is the stock of capital; V A is
value-added; TECH is a technology indicator equal to one if the rm reports having used imported inputs
or FTA; and it is an unobserved component. As in previous literature (see Machin and Van Reenen
(1998) and Pavcnik (2002)), we consider that capital and value-added are not aected by the current wage
bill share of skilled workers. In the case of capital, this is a realistic assumption since although investment
could be correlated with the relative demand for skilled labor, investment in the current period does not
enter the capital stock until the new period. Indeed capital stock will be independent of the unobserved
shocks that inuence the wage bill share of skilled workers. In the case of value-added, this variable is
correlated with the share of skilled labor. To address this issue, we also use the lagged value-added in
the estimations. Finally, we do not consider the skill premium due to the endogeneity issues. Since it
is very hard to nd good instruments for the relative wage of skilled labor and this is beyond the scope
of the present section, we introduce three-digit industry and year dummies instead of relative wages.
Introducing plant xed eects controls for size eects.
The coecient of interest is T . If TECH is complementary with skilled labor, we expect a positive
and signicant coecient. Table 1 presents the ndings of the xed-eect regressions for the entire period
(1979-1999) for the full sample (column 1) and three sub-samples of trade orientation (export oriented,
import competing and non-trade sector19). After controlling for plant heterogeneity, industry and year
indicators, the coecient of the technology indicator is positive and highly signicant. The value of
T is higher for the rms selling on the foreign market (2.8%) than for the import-competing and non-
trade rms (1.4% and 1.3%). Using rm level data of Argentina, Bustos (2005) nds that the growth of
technology spending has a positive impact on the change in skilled upgrading for all rms.
We then run similar regressions using data on export sales for 1990-1999. We add four dummy
variables to equation (I) to indicate the export status of the plants (continuing, new, exiting exporters
and switchers20) ). The omitted variable in this regression corresponds to non-exporting rms. Table
2 presents the ndings of OLS regressions with Hubert White standard errors clustered at plant level.
The rst column shows that technology was complementary with skilled labor in the 1990s (12.7%).
We then control for the plants' productivity levels in the previous period and their foreign status (FDI
indicator)21.In columns 3, 4 and 5, we introduce the export status of the rms. The wage bill share
of skilled labor is higher for all exporting rms compared with non-exporters. Moreover, the results of
18The author's PhD dissertation also estimates the log of the relative demand for skilled labor derived from equation
17.A
19Three-digit industry level plants with more than 15% of exports in their total production are classied as exported-
oriented plants, while those with over a 15% import penetration indicator are classied as import-competing plants. The
rest are considered to be non-trade plants. See Pavcnik (2002) for further details concerning this classication.
20See the classication in Table 5 in Appendix 4
21To control for the presence of multinational rms, a dummy variable equal to one is introduced when the percentage of
foreign capital is higher than 50%
16
column 3 show that continuing exporters (8.4%) have higher skill intensity than new exporters (4.8%),
exiting exporters (5%) and switchers (4%). When we control for past productivity levels, the coecients
are still signicant but the values are lower.
[Table 1 and 2 about here]
4.3 Testing the predictions of the model
Prediction 1: The impact of trade liberalization on technology adoption
In the theoretical model, there are three groups of rms: (1) low-technology domestic rms (the least
productive), (2) low-technology exporters, and (3) high-technology exporters (the most productive). The
model's rst prediction concerns the impact of trade liberalization on the extensive margin of technology
adoption. A reduction in variable trade costs encourages continuing exporters to switch to more advanced
technology, while the least productive exporters do not have enough prots to upgrade their technology.
This prediction is tested by estimating the impact of a reduction in export barriers on the growth in
foreign technology expenditure using the following framework:
(II) lnTECHit = 1 + 2(Export) + 3(BX) + 4(BX  Export) + cZit + it
Where TECH is foreign technology expenditure; BX is the export barrier (or average import taris
among Chile's main trading partners) at two- (three-) digit industry level, which varies across time;
export is a vector of the dummy variables indicating the export status of the plants; and Zit is a vector
of the control variables22.The omitted categories are non-exporters, the year 1990 (1991) and sector 29
(390) (other industries).
Equation (II) disentangles the growth in foreign technology expenditure due to changes in trade
costs depending on the export status of the rm. We are mainly interested in the estimates of the
vector coecient 4. These are the coecients of the interaction terms between export barriers and
export status. A negative and signicant coecient is expected, meaning that a reduction in trade costs
triggers a greater increase in foreign technology expenditure by exporters compared with non-exporters.
The results of the estimation of equation (II) by OLS with standard errors clustered at plant level are
presented in Table 3. The rst three columns of Table 3 present the results with the export border eect,
while the last three columns are based on the average import taris. In columns 1 and 3, we control by
initial rm size and capital intensity. Within the same industry, already-exporting rms have a higher
level of foreign technology than non-exporters after a reduction in trade barriers.
[Table 3 about here]
These results might be capturing other factors that could aect the change in foreign technology
spending such as multinational rms or nancial liberalization. In order to control for these two possible
22The control variables are plant size (measured by sta numbers in the initial year), capital intensity in the initial year,
an FDI indicator and one of the credit constraints. "Financial" is a dummy variable equal to one if the plant reports having
paid a loan tax in year "t" indicating that they are not subject to nancial constraints. Industry aliation (three-digit
ISIC level) and year dummies are also introduced.
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competing explanations, we introduce an indicator of FDI in the previous year (columns 2 and 5) and a
nancial indicator (columns 3 and 6), which identies plants without credit constraints. Not surprisingly,
the coecients of FDI (0.577/0.558) and credit indicators (0.277/0.294) are positive and signicant.
However, after controlling by means of these alternative explanations the coecients of the interaction
terms between continuing exporters, the export barriers are still negative and signicant. The average
reduction of export border eect in the period is 20% and the one of average import tari is 7%. Therefore,
compared with non-exporters, continuing exporters raise their foreign technology expenditure after trade
liberalization from a range of 4% (interaction with BX in column 3) to 7% (interaction with taris in
column 6).
Using a dierent empirical specication (without interactions between export status and export bar-
riers), Bustos (2005) also tests the impact of rms' export status on technology spending for Argentina.
She nds that both new and continuing exporters have a higher level of technology spending than non
exporters and that the change in technology spending is only signicant for new exporters (43%)23. In a
recent work, Bustos (2007) shows that the reduction of Brazilian's taris increases technology spending
of all Argentinean rms by 0.20 log points. For both sub-samples of non exporters and exporters in the
rst year, she nds that rms upgrade technology after the reduction of export taris. For the case of
Chile, when we introduce specic interactions between rms' export status and export barriers, we nd
that only continuing exporters upgrade technology.
Prediction 2: The impact of trade liberalization on the relative skilled labor demand
This model also predicts that, after trade liberalization, exporters producing with high technology
will raise their relative demand for skilled labor. Since more advanced technology is complementary with
skilled labor, exporters that upgrade technology following trade reform will also upgrade skilled labor.
The second prediction posits that exporters that adopt high (foreign) technology increase their relative
demand for skilled labor following a reduction in variable trade costs. We test this prediction using a
similar methodology to that used in the previous section. We estimate the eect of a reduction in variable
trade costs on the relative demand for skilled labor by rm export status.
(III) ln

Hit
Lit

= 1 + 2(Export) + 3(BX) + 4(BX  Export) + 5Zit + eit
The dependant variable is the number of skilled workers over unskilled workers ones

Hit
Lit

, BX is the
export barrier, "`Export"' indicates the export status of plants and Zit is a vector of the same plants'
characteristics of the previous regressions24. Table 4 reports the estimations of equation (IV) by OLS with
Huber White standard errors clustered at plant level. After controlling for the plant's initial productivity,
capital intensity and foreign status, a reduction in export barriers has a signicant positive eect on
continuing exporters' relative demand for skilled labor compared with non-exporters (columns 3 and 6).
23When there is a signicant reduction of export barriers (as in the case of Argentina at the beginning of the nineties)
the theoretical framework also predicts that new exporters upgrade technology. Bustos's ndings conrm this prediction.
24TThe omitted categories are non-exporters, the year 1990 (1991) and the sector 29 (390) (other industries).
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Dierences in skill upgrading between exporters and rms selling only on the domestic market increase
as export barriers decrease. The trade-liberalization-induced increase in the relative demand for skilled
labor by continuing exporters compared with non-exporters ranges from 2% (with both export barriers
measures). This magnitude is similar to the ndings of Bustos (2005) for Argentina. In her empirical
specication (without export barriers), she nds that both continuing and new exporters increase their
skill intensity faster (1.2 percentage points) than never exporting rms.
[Table 4 about here]
5 Conclusions
This paper explores the changes in the extensive margin of technology adoption and its eect on wage
inequalities following trade liberalization. The mechanism is based on the impact of the technology-
upgrading decision on the relative demand for skilled labor and hence on the skill premium. In terms
of policy implications, a reduction in variable trade costs raises the number of rms selling abroad and
encourages the most productive rms to switch to high technology. This enhances the relative demand
for skilled labor and boosts the skill premium. The main contribution of this paper to the existing
literature is to propose a general equilibrium model that links trade, rms' technology choice and wage
inequalities in a framework of heterogeneous rms. This theoretical framework also explains the extensive
empirical evidence: rms selling on foreign markets are not only more productive, but also use modern
technologies and are more skill-intensive than rms selling only on the domestic markets. We provide
evidence in support of the model's key assumption and predictions, drawing on plant level panel data for
Chile's manufacturing sector.
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6 Appendix 1: closed economy equilibrium
The The relative skill per unit cost is an increasing function of the skill premium (equation 8.A):
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Aggregation. Using price rule (eq. 3.A) and plugging it into the aggregate price index yields:
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Averages productivities assuming Pareto distribution. In keeping with Melitz and Ghironi
(2005) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2005), we assume that productivity draws are distributed according
to a Pareto distribution g (') = k('min)
k
(')k+1
with a lower bound 'min and a shape parameter k indexing the
dispersion of productivity levels among rms. Since I assume that 'min = 1 and the condition that ensures
a nite mean of rm size is k > ﬃ  1. The cumulative distribution function is G('i) = 1 

'min
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k
.
Average productivity of rms producing with low technology
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Labor Market Condition: Plugging rms' nal good demands (1.A) into (18.A) and (19.A) and
using (4.A) to express cl; ch, rms' demand of skilled (hl; hh) and unskilled labor is:
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Where i = fl; hg ah > 1 if i = h
Plugging rms' prices (3.A) into (18.A') and (19.A') and then into aggregate skilled and unskilled
labor demands using (20.A) and (21.A), we obtain the aggregate relative demand for skilled labor (22.A).
Proof of Proposition 1: Determination of closed economy equilibrium.
Proof. LMC (22.A), FE (23.A) and ZCP (24.A) conditions jointly determine the equilibrium cuto
level ('l ). In order to obtain this cuto, we plug into eq. 24.A the averages productivities, the technology
cuto (eq. 11.A) and the probabilities using assumption 1:
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Since the relative skilled labor unit cost
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cl

depends on the skill premium, equations 28.A and 22.A
(LMC) determine the equilibrium production cuto.
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Proof of Proposition 2: We partially dierentiate equation 28.A with respect to ch
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to analyze the impact of an exogenous increase in the skill premium on the productivity cuto. Partially
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We can demostrate that
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7 Appendix 2: Open Economy Equilibrium
Averages productivities assuming Pareto distribution.
dl(') =
g(')
G('
xl
) G('
dl
) if '

dl < 'i < '

xl (12.B)
xl(') =
g(')
G('
xh
) G('
xl
) if '

xl < 'i < '

xh (13.1.B)
xh(') =
g(')
1 G('
xh
) if 'i > '

xh (13.2.B)
Average productivity of low technology rms (non exporters and exporters)e'l  ﬂ'dl h 1 (") k+ﬃ 11 " k i 1ﬃ 1 Where ﬂ = h kk (ﬃ 1)i 1ﬃ 1 (14.B)
" =

ft
f
 1
ﬃ 1

ch
cl
1 ﬃ
  1
 h
1 + (1 + ﬁ)
1 ﬃ
i 11 ﬃ
Average productivity of non exporters rms producing with low technologyf'dlﬃ 1  1G('
xl
) G('
dl
)
R 'xl
'
dl
(')
ﬃ 1
g(')d' = ﬂ'dl
h
1 (#) k+ﬃ 1
1 # k
i 1
ﬃ 1
if 'dl < ' < '

xl Where # =

fx
f
 1
ﬃ 1
(1 + ﬁ)
Average productivity of exporters producing with low technology
23
(f'xl)ﬃ 1  1G('
xh
) G('
xl
)
R 'xh
'
xl
(')
ﬃ 1
g(')d' = ﬂ'xl
h
1 (
) k+ﬃ 1
1 
 k
i 1
ﬃ 1
if 'xl < ' < '

xh Where 
 =
"
1+ﬁ

f
fx
 1
ﬃ 1
Average productivity of high technology rms (exporters)
g'xhﬃ 1  11 G('
xh
)
R
1
'
xh
(')
ﬃ 1
g(')d'  ﬂ'xh if ' > '

xh (15.B)
Determination of probabilities
l = 1  "
 k; x =

'dl
'
xl
k
= # k; dl =

1  # k

;
xl =

'dl
'
xl
k
 

'dl
'
xh
k
=

# k   " k

xh =

'dl
'
xh
k
= " k
Using price rule dened in equation 3.B and plugging it into aggregate price index yields
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Labor Market Condition
Plugging rms' nal good demands (1.B) into (18.B) and (19.B), individual demand for skilled
(hxl; hxh) and unskilled labor (lxl; lxh) by exporting rms with low and high technology is:
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Exporters have to hire both types of workers to produce for both domestic and foreign markets. Plug-
ging prices (3.B) into (18.B) and (19.B) and then into aggregate skilled and unskilled labor demand using
(20.B) and (21.B), we obtain the aggregate relative demand for skilled labor (22.B), which determines
the skill premium.
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Proof of Proposition 4: Determination of the open economy equilibrium. Like in the closed
economy equilibrium, LMC (eq. 22.B), FE and ZCP conditions jointly determine the equilibrium cuto
level. Plugging in the ZCP condition the following variables: f'dl; f'xl;g'xh; l; xl xh and 'xl; 'xh, we
obtain the production cuto level as a function of the skill premium and the parameters of the model.
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Proof of Proposition 5: The impact of trade variable costs on average prots.
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A reduction of trade variable costs increases foreign competition and thereby reduces domestic prots
of low technology unskilled intensive rms.
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ts of low technology exporters.
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Proof of proposition 6: The impact of trade costs reduction on the aggregate relative
skilled labor demand. By plugging into the equation (22.B) the average productivity levels and the
number of rms (solved using the Pareto distribution), the aggregate relative skilled labor demand can
be expressed as follows:
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Note that "(ﬁ); #(ﬁ);
(ﬁ) are also functions of ﬁ: These variables are dened in the previous section.
To determine whether the aggregate relative skilled labor demand is a decreasing function of variable
trade costs, we rst analyze H
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Proof of Proposition 7: The impact of the relative skilled labor cost ( ch
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An increase in the skill premium means a reduction of the relative wage of unskilled labor and an
increase of the relative per unit cost of skilled labor. This appreciation of ch
cl
benets the least productive
unskilled intensive rms raising their domestic prots.
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In the second term, the term in brackets is equal to
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Since @"
@
ch
cl
(!)
> 0; @

@
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> 0 ) @xlxl(g'xl)
@
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> 0
An increase in ch
cl
(!)benets unskilled intensive exporters raising also their export prots.
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Partially dierenciating xh(g'xh) with respect to chcl
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Since @"
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> 0; k > ﬃ  1 , ﬃ > 1 and cl
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> 1; both terms are negative:@xh(g'xh)
@
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The appreciation of the skill premium and thereby of the relative skilled per unit cost hurts the most
productive skilled intensive rms decreasing their domestic and export prots.
The impact of the relative skilled labor cost on the productivity cutos
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We can prove that @B
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> 0 ; k > ﬃ  1 and ﬃ > 1:
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Since @"
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Both B and G depend on the skill premium and this variable is determined in the labor market
equilibrium (equation 22.B). We run simulations of the equilibrium production cuto which show @B
@
ch
cl
(!)
>
@G
@
ch
cl
(!)
and thus
@'dl
@
ch
cl
(!)
< 025.
25These results remain robust for dierent parameters values well established in the literature: Consumers' elasticity of
substitution: ﬃ= 3 / 4 (Bernard et al., 2004); the elasticity of substitution between factors in the production function = 2
/2,5 ( =0,5/0,6) (Acemoglu ,2002); Pareto shape parameter k= 3,4 / 5. Following Bernard, Redding and Schott (2004):
fe= 1 / 3; f = 0,1 / 0,4; fx= 0,1 / 0,5 and ft= 0,8/ 2.
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(3) Partially dierenciating (11.1.B) with respect to ch
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Since low technology exporters are unskilled intensive rms, the eect of the relative skilled per unit
costs (and of the skill premium) on the extensive margin of trade ('xl) is similar to the impact on the
extensive margin of production ('dl). An increase of the skill premium (the reduction of the relative
unskilled wage) reduces the production and export cuto:
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> 0:The most
productive high technology rms will suer from an increase in the skill premium.
The net impact of trade variable costs on the productivity cutos
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Since @"
@ﬁ
> 0 and k > ﬃ   1 the rst term is negative. The sing of the second term depends on the
elasticity of relative per unit cost of skilled labor. The simulation results show that @B
@ﬁ
< 0:
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We can demostrate that @G
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< 0: First, the rst term is negative since @#
@ﬁ
> 0 and @"
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> 0 . The second
term is also negative since @
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
# k   " k

> 0 and [k   (ﬃ  1)]
 

k   1

> k
 

k (ﬃ 1)   1

:
Finally, the last term is positive since @"
@ﬁ
> 0; but under the partitioning condition this term is smaller
than the other two (See simulation results, Appendix 3).
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Since @B(ﬁ)
@ﬁ
< 0 and @G(ﬁ)
@ﬁ
< 0 , indeed
@'dl
@ﬁ
< 0: A reduction of trade variable costs (taking
into account the impact of ﬁ on ch
cl
(!)) increases foreign competition and induces the exit of the least
productive rms (raising the production cuto).
(3) Partially dierenciating (11.1.B) with respect to ﬁ yields
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(1 + ﬁ)
i
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In order to see if j'dlj >
@'dl@ﬁ (1 + ﬁ) we replace @'dl@ﬁ : Since 'kdl fE >  ( @B@ﬁ + @G@ﬁ )(1+ﬁ)k  ; indeed we
can prove that
@'xl
@ﬁ
> 0:A reduction of trade variable costs allows the most productive domestic rms to
enter the foreign market.
(4) Partially dierenciating (11.2.B) with respect to ﬁ yields
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= 'xh

1
[(1+ﬁ)ﬃ+(1+ﬁ)]
+
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'
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
> 0
Replacing
@'dl
@ﬁ
; eq. 28.B:
'kdl fE >  ( @B@ﬁ + @G@ﬁ )[(1+ﬁ)ﬃ+(1+ﬁ)]k  ;indeed we can prove that @'xh@ﬁ > 0:
A reduction of trade variable costs allows the most productive low technology exporters to upgrade
technology.
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8 Appendix 3: Simulations results
Case 1: The impact of trade liberalization 
Graph 1: The net effect of a reduction of Ĳ on the production cutoff 
ĳdl*
0.22 0.4 0.6 0.8
   2.00 
 1.91
 1.88
Ĳ
“Foreign competition effect” dominates over the “skill premium effect”: the least productive firms 
exit the market. 
Graph 2: 
The net effect of a reduction of Ĳ on the extensive margin of technology 
ĳxh*
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
?
?
3.91
3.40
3.73
Ĳ
“Extensive margin of technology”: a reduction of trade frictions increases market shares and profits 
of all exporters allowing new firms to adopt high technology. The increase in export profitability 
compensates the negative impact of the raise in the skill premium on the technology adoption decision. 
Partitioning condition: 
Parameters values:  These results remain robust for different parameters values well 
established in the literature: I  (Bernard et al., 2004);D 0.5/0.6 (Acemoglu ,2002); k
=3,4/5. Following Bernard, Redding and Schott (2004): fe=1/2; f=0,1/0,2; Gfx=0,2/0,3 and 
Gft=0,9/1,25; ah = 2/3.
9 Appendix 4: Empirical results
[Figure 4 about here]
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Figure 4 (a): 
Evolution of export barriers between Chile an its main trading partners 
(UE, USA and latin American countries) 
Source : Bas and Ledezma (2007) 
Figure 4 (b): 
Table 1: Fixed Eﬀects regression. DV: Wage bill share of skilled labor (1979-1999)
Full Sample Export Oriented Import Competing Non Traded
ln VA(t-1) 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.038*** 0.036***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
ln K VA(t-1) 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.015*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
TECH ind 0.018*** 0.028*** 0.014*** 0.013***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
Plant Ind, YES YES YES YES
ISIC 3 dig and
Year Ind
Number of Obs 43003 16923 15027 11026
R.Sq. 0.316 0.262 0.230 0.392
Note: Huber White Standard errors clustered by ﬁrm. The intercept is not reported
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Table 2: Dependant variable: Wage bill share of skilled labor (1990-1999)
[M 1] [M 2] [M 3] [M 4] [M 5]
ln VA(t-1) 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.039*** 0.039***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
TECH Ind 0.127*** 0.124*** 0.100*** 0.064***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Foreign Ind 0.072*** 0.054*** 0.040***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
cont exp 0.084*** 0.040*** 0.039***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
new cont 0.048*** 0.022** 0.023**
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
switchers 0.040*** 0.017** 0.018**
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
stop exp 0.052*** 0.033** 0.032**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
TFP(t-1) 0.094*** 0.093***
(0.005) (0.005)
TECH Ind(t-1) 0.065***
(0.006)
FDI Ind(t-1) 0.042***
(0.013)
ISIC 3 dig and YES YES YES YES YES
Year Ind
Number of Obs 19376 19376 19376 18612 18612
Adjusted R-Sq. 0.191 0.195 0.208 0.262 0.262
Note: Huber White Standard errors clustered by ﬁrm. The intercept is not reported
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 3: Prediction 1: The impact of TL on Technology Spending.
Dependant variable: Log of Technology Spending (1990-1999)
BX 1 BX 2 BX 3 Tariﬀs 1 Tariﬀs 2 Tariﬀs 3
Border Eﬀect Exporter 0.107 0.105 0.180*
BX (0.073) (0.091) (0.102)
cont*BX -0.165** -0.205** -0.195*
(0.083) (0.100) (0.101)
new*BX -0.144 -0.140 -0.123
(0.105) (0.128) (0.132)
stop*BX -0.100 -0.142 -0.159
(0.118) (0.147) (0.197)
switchers*BX -0.080 -0.046 -0.035
(0.089) (0.109) (0.104)
Tariﬀ X 0.398** 0.372* 0.383*
(0.186) (0.202) (0.200)
cont*TX -0.943*** -0.948*** -0.946***
(0.190) (0.211) (0.210)
new*TX -0.377 -0.401 -0.425
(0.248) (0.271) (0.259)
stop*TX -0.970*** -0.937*** -0.939**
(0.347) (0.362) (0.370)
switchers*TX -0.178 -0.152 -0.304
(0.214) (0.243) (0.236)
cont exp 1.233*** 1.397*** 1.267*** 2.645*** 2.688*** 2.590***
(0.359) (0.425) (0.429) (0.434) (0.481) (0.478)
new cont 1.316*** 1.303** 1.188** 1.605*** 1.638*** 1.644***
(0.456) (0.540) (0.558) (0.561) (0.611) (0.590)
switchers 0.792** 0.686 0.536 0.871* 0.808 1.053*
(0.381) (0.451) (0.429) (0.494) (0.567) (0.550)
stop exp 0.853 1.070* 1.075 2.633*** 2.587*** 2.500***
(0.528) (0.631) (0.851) (0.791) (0.828) (0.833)
Employment initial 0.941*** 0.920*** 0.904*** 0.950*** 0.929*** 0.913***
(0.037) (0.041) (0.041) (0.038) (0.041) (0.041)
K L initial 0.265*** 0.236*** 0.254*** 0.265*** 0.240*** 0.260***
(0.038) (0.043) (0.040) (0.040) (0.044) (0.041)
FDI Ind (t-1) 0.646*** 0.577*** 0.614*** 0.558***
(0.116) (0.118) (0.122) (0.127)
Financial Ind (t-1) 0.277*** 0.294***
(0.076) (0.078)
TFP initial 0.549*** 0.548***
(0.058) (0.060)
ISIC 3 dig and YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Ind
Number of Obs 9500 6704 6619 8393 6468 6383
Adjusted R-Sq. 0.352 0.355 0.396 0.354 0.359 0.400
Note: Huber White Standard errors clustered by ﬁrm in parentheses
Note: The coeﬃcient of the intercept is not reported. Import Tariﬀs of Chile were dropped
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 4: Prediction 2: The impact of TL on the relative skilled
labor demand. Dependant variable: Skilled over unskilled labor
(1990-1999)
BX 1 BX 2 BX 3 Tariﬀs 1 Tariﬀs 2 Tariﬀs 3
Border Eﬀect Exporter -0.003 -0.011 -0.008
BX (0.015) (0.019) (0.021)
cont*BX -0.090*** -0.089** -0.102***
(0.030) (0.037) (0.038)
new*BX -0.017 -0.011 -0.026
(0.035) (0.042) (0.045)
stop*BX 0.001 -0.031 -0.031
(0.051) (0.064) (0.069)
switchers*BX -0.028 -0.030 -0.034
(0.028) (0.032) (0.033)
Tariﬀ X 0.053 0.051 0.059
(0.039) (0.043) (0.043)
cont*TX -0.302*** -0.285*** -0.319***
(0.072) (0.082) (0.082)
new*TX -0.104 -0.139 -0.162
(0.090) (0.103) (0.104)
stop*TX -0.179 -0.242 -0.268*
(0.131) (0.147) (0.147)
switchers*TX -0.057 -0.044 -0.050
(0.075) (0.082) (0.081)
cont exp 0.395*** 0.358** 0.331** 0.655*** 0.593*** 0.599***
(0.131) (0.157) (0.161) (0.169) (0.193) (0.193)
new cont 0.145 0.086 0.107 0.279 0.330 0.348
(0.148) (0.173) (0.186) (0.202) (0.234) (0.236)
stop exp -0.018 0.091 0.032 0.372 0.495 0.498
(0.215) (0.261) (0.281) (0.298) (0.333) (0.333)
switchers 0.182 0.177 0.152 0.173 0.131 0.110
(0.114) (0.128) (0.131) (0.167) (0.182) (0.181)
TFP initial 0.148*** 0.161*** 0.164*** 0.118*** 0.124*** 0.130***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016)
FDI Ind (t-1) 0.219*** 0.172*** 0.137** 0.097*
(0.059) (0.058) (0.056) (0.055)
Tariﬀ M -0.270*** -0.311***
(0.038) (0.034)
K L initial 0.084*** 0.074***
(0.009) (0.009)
ISIC 3 dig and YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Ind
Number of Obs 25992 18587 18587 22341 18204 18204
AAdjusted R-Sq. 0.093 0.093 0.103 0.123 0.125 0.133
Note: Huber White Standard errors clustered by ﬁrm in parentheses
Note: The coeﬃcient of the intercept is not reported
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 5: Variables description
[Variable] [Data]
Employment E Total labour
Skilled labor H Non production workers: employees paid by
commissions, administrative stuﬀ, subcontract
employees and other non production employees.
Unskilled labor L Production workers
Skill intensity H/E Non production workers over total labour
Relative skilled labor demand H/L Non production over production workers
Wage rate of skilled labor Wh Wages paid to non production workers over
the number of non production workers hired
Wage rate of unskilled labor Wl Wages paid to production workers over the
number of production workers hired
Wage bill shared of skilled labor S Wage bill of non production workers over total
wage bill of production and non production workers
Value Added VA Sales minus variable inputs deﬂated by sectoral
level deﬂators (Isic-3dig Rev 2 1992)
Capital labour ratio K/L Capital stock over total workers
Total Technology spending TECH Exdpenditures of imported inputs and FTA
Total factor productivity TFP Total factor productivity estimated using Levinsohn and
Petrin methodology in Bas and Ledezma (2007)
Financial Indicator Financial Ind Dummy variable equals to one if the plant reports
having paid a loan tax in year ”‘t”’
Foreign Direct Investment FDI Ind Dummy variable equal to one if the ﬁrm
has more than 50% of foreign capital
Continuing exporters Cont exp Dummy variable equal to one if the ﬁrm
exports during the whole period
New exporters New cont Dummy variable equal to one if the ﬁrm does not export
at the beginning of the period and starts exporting afterwards
Stop exporting Stop exp Dummy variable equal to one if the ﬁrm exports at
the beginning of the period and stops exporting afterwards
Switchers Switchers Dummy variable equal to one if the ﬁrm enters and exits
the foreign market more than once
Border Eﬀect Exporter BX Export barriers at 2 digit industry level estimated
by Bas and Ledezma (2007).
Table 6: Summary Statistics by Export Status (1990-1999)
[Exporters] [Non Exporters]
Number of Firms 31% (1196) 69% (2704)
Continuing exporters 12%
New exporters 7%
Stop exporting 3%
Switchers 9%
Size %
Large (more 150 workers) 40% 6%
Medium (50-149 workers) 36% 20%
Small (10-49 workers) 24% 74%
TFP (Mean) 2740 (176) 1149 (23)
Employment (Mean) 202 (4) 55 (0.61)
Skill intensity (Mean) 0.30 (0.003) 0.25 (0.001)
Capital Intensity (Mean) 7838 (225) 2593 (46)
FTA (%) 14% 3%
Import share of inputs expenditure (%) 53% 11%
Type of Ownership Foreign 11% 1%
Note: Standard errors of means are reported in parentheses.
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Table 7: Exporter Premia: TFP by export status. Dependant variable: TFP
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
cont exp 0.429*** 0.294*** 0.293*** 0.282*** 0.208***
(0.036) (0.041) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
new cont 0.284*** 0.208*** 0.190*** 0.176*** 0.109**
(0.043) (0.044) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
switchers 0.258*** 0.200*** 0.187*** 0.173*** 0.133***
(0.033) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034)
stop exp 0.128* 0.043 -0.001 -0.014 -0.049
(0.068) (0.070) (0.074) (0.074) (0.071)
Employment initial 0.089*** 0.072*** 0.057*** 0.025*
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
FDI Ind(t-1) 0.160*** 0.161*** 0.140**
(0.057) (0.057) (0.055)
Financial Ind (t-1) 0.112*** 0.075***
(0.021) (0.021)
TECH Ind 0.313***
(0.025)
ISIC 3dig IND YES YES YES YES YES
Year IND
Number of Obs 25990 25990 18588 18588 18588
Adjusted R-Sq. 0.367 0.372 0.397 0.400 0.415
Note: Huber White Standard errors clustered by ﬁrm in parentheses
Note: The coeﬃcient of the intercept is not reported
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Table 8: Decomposition of Relative Demand of Skilled labor (H/L)
[Total] [Between] [Within] [Within/Total]
1979-1999
Industries at 2 digit 0,079 -0,014 0,093 1,182
Industries at 3 digit 0,202 -0,005 0,206 1,023
Firms 0,227 0,068 0,158 0,697
1979-1986
Industries at 2 digit 0,377 0,110 0,267 0,708
Industries at 3 digit 0,238 -0,033 0,272 1,140
Firms 0,317 0,173 0,143 0,452
1990-1999
Industries at 2 digit 0,056 0,001 0,055 0,983
Industries at 3 digit 0,068 0,002 0,066 0,969
Firms 0,044 -0,083 0,127 2,846
Table 9: Decomposition of Relative Skilled Wage
[Total] [Between] [Within] [Within/Total]
1979-1999
Industries at 2 digit 0,014 -0,008 0,022 1,549
Industries at 3 digit 0,324 0,041 0,283 0,873
Firms 1,518 0,464 1,054 0,694
1979-1986
Industries at 2 digit 0,127 0,002 0,124 0,980
Industries at 3 digit 0,518 -0,010 0,528 1,020
Firms 0,752 0,339 0,412 0,548
1990-1999
Industries at 2 digit 0,157 -0,038 0,195 1,245
Industries at 3 digit 0,563 -0,295 0,858 1,524
Firms 0,639 0,100 0,539 0,843
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